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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Percy Dillon appeals from the sentence imposed by the 
District Court following a violation of the conditions of his 
supervised release.  In 1993, Dillon was convicted of three 
drug-related felony counts and was sentenced to 322 months 
in prison along with “a term” of five years of supervised 
release.  Dillon argues that by using this language, the District 
Court sentenced him to a single term of supervised release, 
rather than to three concurrent terms, and that it was therefore 
plain error for the District Court to impose three consecutive 
terms of reimprisonment and three concurrent terms of 
supervised release when it revoked Dillon’s supervised 
release in 2012.  We will vacate Dillon’s sentence and 
remand to the District Court for resentencing. 
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I. 
On September 17, 1993, a jury convicted Dillon and 
his co-conspirator Jerron Lollis of (1) conspiracy to distribute 
more than 50 grams of crack and 500 grams of cocaine, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (“Count One”); (2) use of a 
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (“Count Two”); and 
(3) possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of 
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (“Count Four”).  
At a sentencing hearing on November 19, 1993, the District 
Court announced its sentence: 
“Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 it is the judgment of the Court that the 
defendant, Percy Dillon, is hereby committed to 
the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be 
imprisoned for a term of 322 months.  This term 
consists of a term of 262 months as to Counts 1 
and 4 and a term of 60 months as to Count 2 to 
be served consecutively with the term imposed 
at Counts 1 and 2 [sic; should be “Counts 1 and 
4”]. 
“Upon release from imprisonment the defendant 
shall be placed on supervised release for a term 
of five years.” 
App. at 39.  Three days later, the District Court filed its 
written judgment of sentence: 
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“The defendant is hereby committed to the 
custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons 
to be imprisoned for a term of three-hundred 
and twenty-two (322) months.  This term 
consists of a term of two hundred and sixty-two 
(262) months as to Counts 1 and 4 and a term of 
sixty (60) months as to Count 2, to be served 
consecutively with the term imposed at Counts 
1 and 4. 
“Upon release from imprisonment, the 
defendant shall be on supervised release for a 
term of five (5) years.” 
App. at 30-31.  This was the minimum possible sentence 
under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines.  In 2008 
and again in 2011, after the crack guidelines were amended 
by the Sentencing Commission, Dillon’s sentence was 
reduced, first to 270 months, and then to time served.1
                                              
1 On the effective date of the second set of retroactive 
amendments to the crack guidelines, Dillon had only 14 
months left on his sentence.  Because Dillon’s new guideline 
range amounted to a 42-month reduction from his previous 
sentence, Dillon ended up serving approximately 28 months 
more than what was called for by his amended guideline 
sentence. 
  On 
November 10, 2011, Dillon was released in the Northern 
District of Texas and began his supervised release. 
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On the evening of December 5, 2011, after spending 
the day at a local shopping mall applying for jobs, Dillon 
called his cousin (and former co-conspirator) Jerron Lollis 
and asked him for a ride home.  When Lollis arrived 45 
minutes later, Dillon entered the car and immediately smelled 
marijuana, confirmed with Lollis that there was marijuana in 
the car, but remained in the vehicle, telling Lollis to “take me 
out of here; just take me home, man.”  On their way out of the 
mall’s parking lot, the car was spotted and pulled over by 
Officer Fred Kemp, who called for backup.  When Officer 
Kemp tapped on the window and Lollis rolled it down, the 
officer was “immediately hit by a really strong smell of 
unburned or fresh marijuana.” 
After backup arrived in the person of Officer Richard 
Hernandez, the situation escalated: Officer Kemp ordered 
Lollis and Dillon out of the car, Lollis then revved the engine 
and pulled away (with Officer Hernandez dangling from the 
window), and Officer Kemp discharged his weapon in an 
attempt to stop the vehicle.  Once the car stopped, the officers 
arrested Lollis and Dillon and recovered over 65 pounds of 
marijuana from the vehicle.  Lollis claimed sole responsibility 
for the drugs. 
Following this incident, both Dillon and Lollis were 
charged with supervised-release violations.  The Probation 
Office alleged that Dillon violated three conditions:  (1) that 
he not commit another federal, state, or local crime; (2) that 
he not illegally possess a controlled substance; and (3) that he 
not associate with any persons involved in criminal activity or 
with any persons convicted of a felony unless granted 
permission to do so.  After a hearing, the District Court found 
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that Dillon had not violated the first two conditions, but had 
violated the third, which constituted a Grade C violation.  See 
U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(3). 
The District Court then stated that under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3583(e)(3), “the Court may sentence [Dillon] to serve up to 
five years’ imprisonment at Count 1, two years’ 
imprisonment at Count 2, and three years’ imprisonment at 
Count 4.”  App. at 180.  The court also noted that under 
§ 3584(a), it could impose these terms concurrently or 
consecutively.  It further noted that under U.S.S.G. 
§ 7B1.4(a), the guidelines-recommended sentence for 
Dillon’s Grade C violation, given Dillon’s criminal history 
category of II, was four to ten months. 
Notwithstanding the guidelines recommendation, 
however, the District Court found that “a term of 
imprisonment within this range is insufficient to comply with 
the factors set forth in Title 18 of the United States Code, 
Section 3553(a).”  App. at 181.  Because Dillon violated the 
terms of his supervised release so soon after being released 
from prison; because he associated with his former co-
conspirator, Jerron Lollis; because he did not try to exit 
Lollis’s car after smelling marijuana; and because he did all 
this after spending 19 years in prison, which showed that 
Dillon had “learned little from [his] lengthy term,” the 
District Court revoked Dillon’s supervised release and 
sentenced him to reimprisonment: 
“Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 it is the judgment of the Court that the 
Defendant Percy Dillon is hereby committed to 
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the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be 
imprisoned for a term of 24 months, consisting 
of a term of one month at Count 1, a term of 11 
months at Count 2, and a term of 12 months at 
Count 4, all such terms to be served consecutive 
to each other. 
“Upon release from imprisonment, the 
Defendant shall be placed on supervised release 
for a term of 59 months at Count 1, 25 months 
at Count 3, and 48 months at Count 4, to be 
served concurrently.” 
App. at 182-83.  Such a lengthy term of supervised release 
was necessary, in the District Court’s view, due to Dillon’s 
“poor compliance with [his] conditions of release.”  Id. at 
182. 
Dillon’s timely notice of appeal to this Court followed. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction at Dillon’s 
supervised-release revocation hearing under 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3231 and 3583(e).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
Because Dillon never objected before the District 
Court on the grounds asserted here, we review for plain error.  
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects 
substantial rights may be considered even though it was not 
brought to the court’s attention.”).  We may reverse a district 
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court’s decision on plain error review only if we conclude 
that (1) there was an error; (2) the error was “plain,” that is, 
“clear” or “obvious”; (3) the error “affect[s] substantial 
rights,” which “in most cases” means that the error must have 
been prejudicial; and (4) the error “seriously affect[s] the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-36 
(1993) (internal citations omitted). 
III. 
Dillon argues that his original 1993 sentence included 
a single term of supervised release, not three concurrent 
terms, and that the District Court therefore committed plain 
error when it revoked his supervised release in 2012 and 
imposed three (consecutive) terms of imprisonment and three 
(concurrent) terms of supervised release.  We agree. 
A. 
In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress 
eliminated most forms of parole in favor of supervised 
release, a form of post-confinement monitoring that is 
overseen by the sentencing court, rather than the Parole 
Commission.  See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 
696-97 (2000).  The law authorizes a district court, when 
sentencing a defendant to a prison term for a felony or 
misdemeanor offense, to include a term of supervised release 
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as a part of the sentence.  18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (1993).2  
Section 3583(b) outlines the maximum allowable terms of 
supervised release: five years for a Class A or Class B felony; 
three years for a Class C or Class D felony; and one year for a 
Class E felony or a misdemeanor.3
Upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence 
that a defendant has violated the conditions of his supervised 
release, a district court may “revoke a term of supervised 
release, and require the person to serve in prison all or part of 
the term of supervised release without credit for time 
previously served on postrelease supervision, . . . except that 
a person whose term is revoked under this paragraph may not 
be required to serve more than 3 years in prison if the offense 
for which the person was convicted was a Class B felony, or 
more than 2 years in prison if such offense is a Class C or D 
felony.”  18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (1993).  The statute also 
  Id. § 3583(b). 
                                              
2 Because post-revocation penalties are considered part 
of the punishment for the original offense, Johnson v. United 
States, 529 U.S. 694, 700-01 (2000), we apply 18 U.S.C 
§§ 3583 and 3553 as they read in March 1993, when Dillon 
committed his original offense. 
3 Count One was a Class B felony because it carried a 
maximum term of 40 years.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) 
(1993).  Count Two was a Class D felony because it carried a 
maximum term of 5 years.  See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1993).  
Count Four was a Class B felony because it carried a 
maximum term of 40 years.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) 
(1993). 
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permits a district court to add an additional term of supervised 
release following a prison term imposed under § 3583(e)(3), 
so long as the sum of the two terms does not exceed the 
originally-imposed term of supervised release.4
At Dillon’s November 1993 sentencing hearing, the 
District Court announced: “Upon release from imprisonment 
the defendant shall be placed on supervised release for a term 
of five years.”  App. at 39.  The court’s judgment, released a 
few days later, contained almost identical language:  “Upon 
release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on 
supervised release for a term of five (5) years.”  App. at 31.  
Dillon argues that this language (specifically, “a term”) 
“plainly refers to only one term of supervised release” and 
that the District Court was without authority to impose three 
consecutive terms of reimprisonment and three concurrent 
terms of supervised release in 2012.  Appellant’s Br. at 29-30. 
 
For support, Dillon relies on United States v. Eskridge, 
445 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2006), in which the Seventh Circuit 
considered a 22-month sentence imposed following the 
defendant’s third supervised-release violation.  Although 
Eskridge had initially been sentenced to two concurrent terms 
                                              
4 In 1994, Congress added § 3583(h), which explicitly 
confers this power upon district courts.  In Johnson v. United 
States, the Supreme Court held that § 3583(h) could not be 
applied retroactively to defendants (like Dillon) who 
committed their offenses prior to 1994, but also held that the 
pre-1994 statute could nevertheless be read to provide for the 
power.  See 529 U.S. at 705-06. 
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of supervised release, after his first violation in 2002, the 
district judge sentenced him to 26 more months of supervised 
release but “did not indicate in the judgment order whether 
these were two (concurrent) terms or one term.”  Id. at 934.  
This mattered, explained Judge Posner, because “consecutive 
terms of imprisonment may be imposed upon revocation of 
concurrent terms of supervised release,” and so “if in 2002 
the district judge [had] actually imposed two terms of 
supervised release, he had two terms that he could revoke,” 
which meant he could order Eskridge to serve consecutive 
prison terms without violating the 2-year maximum.  Id.  The 
court continued: 
“To resolve the issue of clerical error versus 
judicial error, we sent for the transcript of the 
sentencing hearing.  There we discover that in 
imposing supervised release in the first 
revocation the judge stated: ‘Because of the 
short term imposed in this matter the court is 
going to also continue you on supervised 
release for a term of 26 months.’  A term.  This 
was the sentence and it was accurately reflected 
in the written judgment . . . .” 
445 F.3d at 935 (internal citation omitted).  The court 
therefore vacated Eskridge’s sentence and remanded the case 
for resentencing. 
In United States v. Snyder, 635 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 
2011), the Seventh Circuit returned to this issue in a case 
involving a sex offender who had violated the terms of his 
supervised release.  As in Eskridge, the judge at Snyder’s 
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original sentencing hearing had announced that Snyder would 
serve “a term” of six years of supervised release following his 
168 months in prison.  Id. at 958.  After Snyder violated the 
terms of his supervised release almost immediately, the 
district court revoked supervised release and sent Snyder back 
to prison for what it believed to be the statutory maximum:  
two years on each of his four convictions, to run 
consecutively.  Id. at 959. 
Because the district court announced this sentence 
without any mention of the applicable guidelines range, the 
Seventh Circuit vacated Snyder’s sentence and remanded.  
But in doing so, the court also noted that based on the 
language used by the district judge in the sentencing order 
and transcript, Snyder had actually been sentenced only to a 
single term of supervised release, id. at 958 n.1, and the 
maximum term of reimprisonment to which he could be 
sentenced was only 24 months, id. at 960 n.4. 
Here, the government argues that despite what it said, 
the District Court in 1993 actually meant to sentence Dillon 
to three concurrent terms of supervised release.  Moreover, 
because it claims that the District Court was “obligated by 
law” to impose supervised release on both Counts One and 
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Four,5
This argument is flawed in two respects.  First, the 
government never objected in 1993 to the District Court’s 
imposition of “a term” of supervised release, nor did it cross-
appeal and assert any error.  As Judge Posner recognized in 
Eskridge, if a district court’s order “accurately reflects the 
judge’s decision, however mistaken, to impose just a single 
term [of supervised release], it cannot be corrected because 
none of the statutory provisions authorizing the sentencing 
judge to modify a sentence that he has imposed is applicable 
to such a case.”  445 F.3d at 934 (emphasis added); see also 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 (“After giving any notice it considers 
appropriate, the court may at any time correct a clerical error 
in a judgment, order, or other part of the record, or correct an 
error in the record arising from oversight or omission.”); 
Eskridge, 445 F.3d at 934 (“If the failure of the judgment 
 the government asks us to hold that “by operation of 
law,” the District Court’s 1993 sentence “actually involved 
two terms of supervised release: a five-year term at Count 
One and a concurrent four-year term at Count Four.”  Gov’t 
Br. at 25-26. 
                                              
5 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1993) [Count One] 
(“Any sentence under this subparagraph shall, in the absence 
of [a prior conviction for a felony drug offense], impose a 
term of supervised release of at least 5 years in addition to 
such term of imprisonment . . . .”); id. § 841(b)(1)(B) [Count 
Four] (“Any sentence imposed under this subparagraph shall, 
in the absence of [a prior conviction for a felony drug 
offense], include a term of supervised release of at least 4 
years in addition to such term of imprisonment . . . .”). 
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order to state that the judge was imposing two (concurrent) 
terms of supervised release . . . was merely a clerical error—
that is, if the court announced two terms but the clerk who 
typed the 2002 judgment included just one—then Rule 36 
will allow correction even now.”). 
Second, even if Dillon’s 1993 sentence could 
somehow be transmogrified “by operation of law,” this would 
still fail to explain why the District Court in 2012 thought it 
could revoke three concurrent terms of supervised release 
instead of two.  As the government admits, only Counts One 
and Four of the 1993 Superseding Indictment carried 
mandatory terms of supervised release.  The government 
acknowledges that the 1993 oral and written judgments made 
no reference to Count Two, but claims that “the District 
Court’s treatment of [Count Two] during the revocation 
hearing reflects that it originally intended to impose three 
separate and concurrent terms of supervised release.”  Gov’t 
Br. at 26-27.  But even if the District Court’s actions in 2012 
could give us any insight into what it had “intended” to do 
almost two decades earlier, the government never explains 
why we should consider those intentions relevant.  See 
Snyder, 635 F.3d at 960 n.4 (“[E]ven if the court meant to 
sentence Snyder differently, it no longer has the authority to 
modify the original sentence to correct the error.”). 
“A defendant cannot be reimprisoned for violating the 
conditions of non-existent terms of supervised release.”  
Snyder, 635 F.3d at 960 n.4.  In 1993, when the District Court 
sentenced Dillon to “a term” of supervised release, it capped 
the number of supervised release terms it could revoke at any 
future proceeding at one.  This conclusion is supported by the 
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plain text of § 3583(e)(3), which authorizes the court to 
“revoke a term of supervised release, and require the person 
to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised 
release.”  18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (1993) (emphases added). 
We join the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
and hold that where, as here, a district court’s sentence 
includes “a term” of supervised release, the court may not 
sentence the defendant to multiple terms of reimprisonment 
and/or supervised release upon a subsequent revocation of 
supervised release.  The District Court therefore erred when it 
sentenced Dillon to three consecutive terms of 
reimprisonment and three concurrent terms of supervised 
release. 
B. 
Although the District Court erred at Dillon’s 
revocation hearing by sentencing Dillon to three consecutive 
terms of reimprisonment and three concurrent terms of 
supervised release, Dillon never objected before the District 
Court, and so we must review for plain error.  We may 
reverse a district court’s decision on plain error review only if 
we conclude that (1) there was an error; (2) the error was 
“plain,” that is, “clear” or “obvious”; (3) the error “affect[s] 
substantial rights,” which “in most cases” means that the error 
must have been prejudicial; and (4) the error “seriously 
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-36 
(1993). 
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We will exercise our discretion to correct the District 
Court’s erroneous imposition of multiple terms of 
reimprisonment and supervised release.  The District Court’s 
error was “plain” because the language of the 1993 sentence – 
“a term of five years” – was unambiguous.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Moore, 375 F.3d 259, 265 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding 
plain error where district court admitted irrelevant and 
prejudicial evidence despite “clear and unambiguous” 
command of Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)); United States v. 
Knobloch, 131 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding plain 
error where district court ignored “unambiguous directive” of 
guidelines application note); United States v. Leonard, 157 
F.3d 343, 346 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding plain error where 
district court failed to apply “clear and unambiguous” 
sentencing guideline language). 
The District Court’s erroneous multiple-terms sentence 
was prejudicial to Dillon due to its implications for a 
hypothetical second revocation of his supervised release: a 
judge at such a hearing may see that Dillon was sentenced to 
multiple terms at his first revocation and presume that he may 
also impose multiple terms.  Because the type of error made 
by the District Court is one that “may result in arbitrary 
differences in sentencing similarly situated defendants,” we 
will grant Dillon relief “in order to maintain the fairness, 
integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  
United States v. Vazquez-Lebron, 582 F.3d 443, 447 (3d Cir. 
2009). 
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IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate Dillon’s 
sentence and remand to the District Court for resentencing.6
                                              
6 In the alternative, Dillon claims that the District 
Court’s sentence was procedurally unreasonable because it 
failed to consider his approximately 28 months of over-
incarceration due to his inability to obtain the full benefit of 
the retroactive crack amendments.  Although we need not 
decide this question today, the District Court should consider 
Dillon’s over-incarceration upon resentencing. 
 
